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CAGE v. LOUISIANA
111 S. Ct. 328 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On April 16, 1986, Tommy Cage attacked two college students
wearing medallions on gold chains. When one of the students
attempted to flee, Cage shot him in the lower back with a .38 caliber
gun. The jury found that Cage then fatally shot the victim in the head,
took the medallion, and ran into a nearby housing project. As a result,
the Louisiana trial court convicted Cage of first-degree murder and
sentenced him to death.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Cage argued that
the reasonable doubt instruction used in the guilt phase of his trial was
constitutionally defective under the United States Supreme Court
opinion In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the accused
is protected against conviction under the fourteenth amendment
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged). The instruction
Cage challenged stated in relevant part:
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element
necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty
to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of
not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt,
however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is
founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon
mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt aswould
give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by
reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or
lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible
doubt. It is an actualsubstantialdoubt. It is a doubt that a
reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is
not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral
certainty. State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39,41 (La. 1989) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that "taking the
charge as a whole, reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence would
understand the definition of 'reasonable doubt."' Id. The United States
Supreme Court granted Cage's petition for a writ of certiorari, and in
apercuriam opinion, vacated Cage's sentence and remanded the case
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

reasoned that "the words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required
for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard." Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 328,329-330 (1990). When those words are considered with the requirement that the defendant be found guilty by a
"moral certainty," as opposed to an evidentiary certainty,jurors could
easily find the defendant in this case guilty.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In this case the Court returned to a previously employed standard
of review for ambiguous jury instructions: A standard different from
the one only recently announced in Boyde v. California,110 S. Ct.
1190 (1990). See case summary of Boyde v. California,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 11, (1990). The Cage Court held that
when reviewing an ambiguous jury instruction, the Court should
consider "how reasonable jurors could have understood the charge as
a whole." Cage, 111 S. Ct. at 329. This standard is consistent with the
approach previously established in Francisv. Franklin,471 U.S. 307
(1985). Conversely, the Boyde Court had framed the question as
"whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the
challenged jury instructions in a way that prevents the consideration
of constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1196.
The Virginia Supreme Court, when reviewing challenged jury
instructions, has also engaged in the "taking the charge as a whole"
analysis which the Louisiana Supreme Court utilized in upholding
Cage's conviction. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court has said
that even though a challenged instruction was not artfully drawn, "we
are of the opinion that, read as a whole, it fairly expounds the thrust
of the statute." M. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 480, 248
S.E.2d 135, 150 (1978), Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 360
S.E.2d 352 (1987), Turnerv. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543,364 S.E.2d
483 (1988), Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d
757 (1989), Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275,384 S.E.2d 785
(1989). This standard response, that the instruction "read as a whole"
is fair, did not prevail in the Cage decision.
The former Boyde standard of review, that examined the likely
manner in which the jury as a whole applied the challenged instruction, made it more difficult for the defendant to obtain relief. Thus,
the U.S. Supreme Court's apparent return to a "reasonable juror"
evaluation standard may indicate that the Court will be more willing
to examine potentially unconstitutional jury instructions.

HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the wording of the jury instruction
could lead a reasonable juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof
lower than that required by the Due Process Clause. The Court

Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas

GASKINS v. MCKELLAR
916 F.2d 941 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Donald Henry Gaskins, who was serving ten life sentences, nine
of which were for murder, was convicted and sentenced to death for
the capital murder of fellow death row inmate Rudolph Tyner.
Gaskins appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court which affirmed
both his conviction and sentence. State v. Gaskins,284 S.C. 105, 326

S.E.2d 132 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985). Gaskins'
subsequent efforts to obtain state post-conviction relief also failed.
See Gaskins v. State, No. 85-CP-40-3466, Letter Order (S.C. Jan. 7,
1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987).
Gaskins sought federal review under 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1990) in
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The
district court denied the writ without an evidentiary hearing. Gaskins

